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I. Introduction
On September 3, 1988, The Japan Economic Journal placed on
its front page an eye-catching article entitled "Industrial Restructur-
ing Raises Fear of Endemic Unemployment." ' The article discussed
in some detail Japan's employment situation in the structurally de-
pressed industries and focused on the rising unemployment rate in
the "smokestack" regions' as a consequence of extensive industrial
restructuring. The article also highlighted the need for labor forces
to adjust to the ongoing changes in Japan's economic and social
structures.
Many people in the West do not readily associate Japan with
unemployment and industrial decline, and much of the recent litera-
ture on Japan does not address the subject of unemployment at all.
Instead, most commentaries on Japan tend to analyze various as-
pects of Japan's spectacular rise in economic power from its shat-
tered society after World War II to the relative affluence it currently
enjoys.3 There is, however, a growing fascination within academic
circles regarding Japan's declining industries and adjustment assis-
tance policy. 4 This interest stems from two considerations: (1) gener-
1. Kitamatsu, Industrial Restructuring Raises Fear of Endemic Unemployment, Japan
Econ. J., Sept. 3, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
2. Id. at 1, col. 3. For a brief discussion on Japanese industrial geography, see Y. KOSAI,
THE ERA OF HIGH-SPEED GROWTH 123 (1981).
3. One scholar proposed that Japan's postwar surge in economic power "was actually
only beginning in 1962, when production was just a third of what it would be by 1975. Fully
half of Japan's amazing economic strength was to be manifested after 1966." C. JOHNSON,
MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 3 (1982).
Another commentator wrote that from "1946 to 1976, the Japanese economy increased
55-fold." Lockwood, Economic Developments and Issues, in THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
89 (H. Passin ed. 1975); and T. UCHINO, JAPAN'S POSTWAR ECONOMIC POLICIES 6 (1976).
The sources of Japan's economic growth include: (a) exploitation of economics of scale, (b)
more capital per worker, (c) less labor misallocated to agriculture and non-agricultural self-
employment, (d) changes in working hours and composition of labor force, (e) increased edu-
cation per worker, (f) reduced international trade barriers, (g) less land per worker, and (h)
advances in knowledge and miscellaneous determinants. Gatti, Reindustrialization: A Cure
Worse Than the Disease?, in THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION 167, 179 (J. Gatti
ed. 1981).
4. See generally Upham, The Legal Framework of Japan's Declining Industries Policy:
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ally, declining industries present serious socioeconomic problems for
the industrialized nations;5 and (2) Japan has achieved a certain de-
gree of success in its policy approach to the adjustment of its declin-
ing industries in light of changing economic conditions.6
The purpose of this Comment is to re-evaluate Japan's employ-
ment adjustment policies for the declining industries in the late
1970s and early 1980s and to assess the prospects for continuing
those policies into the 1990s. Section II examines the background of
industrial decline and unemployment in the structurally depressed
industrial sectors of Japan. Section III explores some of the policy
responses of the Japanese government which address unemployment
in the troubled industries. Specifically, it discusses the Japanese pol-
icy-making process and how the mechanisms within that process pro-
vide for a flexible and comprehensive approach to employment ad-
justment. Additionally, it considers the legislation which has made
employment adjustment possible for Japan. Finally, Section IV eval-
uates Japan's adjustment assistance for unemployed workers in the
declining industrial sectors with an emphasis on employment-related
legislation and the Japanese government's capacity to implement the
purposes of the employment adjustment programs.
II. Background of Japan's Declining Industries and Unemployment
in Those Sectors
A. The Causes of Industrial Decline in Japan
Industries go into decline for a variety of reasons. The most
commonly cited cause is the reduced ability of an industry to adjust
to changing conditions which result from slower economic growth.7
Japanese industries, even against the backdrop of vast economic
power, are no exception. Industrial decline is not a recent develop-
The Problem of Transparency in Administrative Processes, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 425-65
(1986); Uriu, The Declining Industries of Japan: Adjustment and Reallocation, 38 J. INT'L
AFF. 99-111 (1984); Tanaka & Middleton, Injured Industries, Imports and Industrial Policy:
A Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Practices, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 419-443 (1983);
and Boyer, How Japan Manages Declining Industries, 107 FORTUNE 58 (Jan. 10, 1983).
5. In addition to being a burden on industry as a whole, declining industries are causing
disruptions in employment; "in communities which are heavily dependent on those industries,
industrial decline merely adds to the misery of recession-hit, troubled local economies." Uriu,
supra note 4, at 102. There is also evidence of labor migration to urban areas in search of
employment. THE JAPAN INSTITUTE OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY 5
(1982) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT POLICY].
6. See Tanaka & Middleton, supra note 4, at 439-40; see generally Uriu, supra note 4.
7. From 1967 to 1972, Japan's economic growth rate in terms of real GNP was approxi-
mately 9.3 percent per annum, reflecting the success of the Japanese industrial policy at the
time. The growth rate, however, dropped to about 4.4. percent per annum between 1976 and
1984. Economic Planning Agency, Economic White Paper, in NIHON NO HAKUSHO (The
White Papers of Japan) 400 (Nihon Jnhn KyZiku Kenkynkai ed. 1987) [hereinafter JAPANESE
WHITE PAPERS]. But note that "the real economic growth rate which was attained was always
more than that projected by the Government." EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5, at 5.
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ment in Japan;8 it has experienced difficulties in a number of indus-
tries" following the oil crisis of the mid-1970s. 10
From the mid-1950s to the late 1960s when Japan had been
pursuing an aggressive industrial policy of promoting rapid economic
growth,1" "it was relatively easy to shift industrial resources into the
8. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INDUSTRIAL POLICY: JAPAN'S FLEX-
IBLE APPROACH, GA 1.13:ID-82-32, at 66, June 23, 1982 (report to the Chairman, Joint Eco-
nomic Committee United States Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States)
[hereinafter INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT].
9. "[V]irtually all Japanese manufacturing industries, with the exception of food
processing, have experienced decline . . . since 1973." Saxonhouse, Industrial Restructuring
in Japan, 5 J. JAPAN. STUD. 273, 283 (1979).
A list of declining Japanese industries would include rubber, steel, corrugated cardboard,
textiles, nonferrous metals, shipbuilding, and some petrochemical sectors. Id. at 280. Note that
some of these industries played a significant role in Japan's postwar reconstruction and in her
ensuing efforts to become an internationally competitive economy. See also infra note 11. This
is because
[t]he development of . . .key industries [such as] steel, nonferrous metals, and
chemicals did much to induce the expansion of many affiliated and processing
industries . . .[D]espite the heavy emphasis which the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) had placed up to 1970 on the development of capi-
tal-intensive key industries, the less capital-intensive processing sectors, which
had acquired little in the way of initiatives and protection, outperformed the key
industries.
M. SHINOHARA, INDUSTRIAL GROWTH, TRADE AND DYNAMIC PATTERNS IN THE JAPANESE
ECONOMY 8 (1982).
A more recent list of declining industries in Japan would also include aircraft, weapons,
gunpowder, nuclear power, space exploration, electronic computers, electronic components for
the "next generation" of computers, laser-processing and optical communication, innovative
materials (amorphous or super-conductive materials), nonmercurial electrolysis of salt, seabed
petroleum recovery, and leather and leather goods. Smith, The Japanese Foreign Exchange
and Foreign Trade Control Law and Administrative Guidance: The Labyrinth and the Castle,
16 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 417, 467 (1984).
10. See Rohlen, "Permanent Employment" Faces Recession, Slow Growth and an Ag-
ing Work Force, 5 J. JAPAN. STUD. 235, 235-36 (1979). The author stated:
Following the oil shock of late 1973, Japan experienced its worst postwar reces-
sion. The index of production for manufacturing dropped by 11.5 per cent in just
fourteen months beginning in November 1973. Despite . . .cutbacks, manufac-
turers' inventories piled up precariously. The number of bankruptcies rose by 41
per cent during the first year [of the recession]. The impact of the recession was
much heavier in some areas of manufacturing than in others . . . and [high
wage settlements in 1973 and 1974 meant the recession in manufacturing did
not quickly translate into a stagnation of consumer demand for goods and
services.
Id.
11. Many experts of Japanese economic history agree that Japan's industrial policy has
passed through three distinct phases since the termination of World War II. See J. ABEGGLEN,
THE STRATEGY OF JAPANESE BUSINESS 102 (1984). In the first stage (1940s to mid-1950s),
Japanese industrial policy focused on "reconstruction and on putting in place certain key in-
dustries deemed necessary to further economic progress. These included electrical power, steel,
and cement-the basic industrial sectors prerequisite to a developed economy." Id.
The second phase (mid-1950s to late 1960s) emphasized international competitiveness.
"The heavy industries-steel, metal, oil refining, and machinery-and the chemical industry
were given high priority in view of their large income elasticity and their likelihood of produc-
tivity in the future." Wakiyama, The Nature and Tools of Japan's Industrial Policy, 27
HARV. INT'L L.J. 467, 468 (1986).
From the 1970s and through the 1980s, the third level, Japan's industrial policy has been
oriented "toward a shift to a 'knowledge-intensive industrial structure,' encouraging high-tech-
nology industries, sophisticated software industries and other industries generating high value-
added content." Id.
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:3
[then] emerging industries," 2 such as automobiles and petrochemi-
cals. After the oil crisis of 1973, Japan's economic growth decreased
in response to the worldwide recession caused in part by the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC's) price fixing prac-
tices." As a consequence, it became more difficult to reallocate labor
and capital resources into the burgeoning higher-growth industries,"'
and some of Japan's already-burdened industries began to feel the
increased pressure of an economy in transition.
In addition to reduced economic growth, Japan's declining in-
dustries have been adversely affected by trade and competition"6
coming primarily from the newly industrializing economies of Asia.1 6
Japanese companies have been further hampered by import restric-
tions imposed by its trading partners.1 7 Factors such as losses in in-
ternational comparative advantage, 8 increases in costs of labor,19 en-
ergy, and raw materials,20  price distortions and currency
fluctuations,21 changes in consumer tastes,22 and sluggish world de-
For more detailed reviews of Japanese industrial policy, see generally H. PATRICK & H.
RosoVSKY, ASIA'S NEW GIANT (1976) [hereinafter ASIA'S NEw GIANT]; and C. JOHNSON,
supra note 3.
12. INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, at 66.
13. Id. at 46. Krause & Sekiguchi, Japan and the World Economy, in ASIA'S NEw
GIANT, supra note 11, at 440.
14. INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, at 66.
15. Rapp, Industrial Structure and Japanese Trade Friction: U.S. Policy Responses, 37
J. INT'L AFF. 67, 68 (1983).
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) also commented as follows:
In the 1980s our country's imports from the United States and from Southeast
Asia have been on the rise. Imports from the United States include aircraft,
medical equipment, computers, semi-conductors, and other high-technology pre-
cision products .... Increases in imports from Southeast Asia are evident for
metals, aluminum, clothing, furs, and semi-conductors.
MITI, Trade White Paper, in JAPANESE WHITE PAPERS, supra note 7, at 400.
16. The newly industrializing economies include South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Singapore. The Japanese government is also gradually recognizing that the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philip-
pines) are gaining momentum in Pacific region economics. Id. at 408.
17. See generally Olechowski & Sampson, Current Trade Restrictions in the EEC, the
United States and Japan, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 220-31 (1980).
18. For a discussion of Japan's comparative advantage, see Krause & Sekiguchi, supra
note 13, at 407-10.
19. For example, "[i]n the late 1960s real wages began to rise .... In 1973 and 1974
money wages rose by unprecedented amounts-somewhere between 25 and 30 per cent in
1974-but since 1975 wage rises have again been brought under control. In 1976 money wages
rose by 9-12 per cent and real wages have risen very little since 1974." STATISTICS AND INFOR-
MATION SECTION, MINISTRY OF LABOR, 29 MONTHLY LABOR STATISTICS AND RESEARCH BUL-
LETIN No. 343 8 (Aug. 1977).
20. Saxonhouse, supra note 9, at 302. It has been noted that
[t]he 4- or 5-fold increase in the dollar price of oil since the early 1970s has had
a profound influence on the Japanese economy . . . .At the level of Japanese
resources allocation and ... comparative advantage, the increase in the price of
energy is handicapping and in many cases destroying Japan's energy-intensive
industries.
Id. at 275.
21. "Currency exchange rates affect export and import volume through price distortions,
and ultimately affect Japan's balance of payments." MITI, Trade White Paper, in NIHON NO
JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT POLICY
mand s have all afflicted Japan's most competitive industries. More-
over, other considerations such as obsolete industrial infrastruc-
tures,2 excess production capacity,"5 inefficient facilities,2" and a
cumbersome distribution system 7 have not alleviated the declining
industries' sometimes painful adjustment experiences.
Regardless of the specific causes of industrial decline, statistics2"
have revealed the extent to which industries in primary29 and sec-
ondary80 sectors are giving way, in terms of competitiveness, to in-
fant industries in tertiary3 sectors. 2 While problems associated with
industrial decline are not new phenomena,33 the current difficulties
brought on by Japan's slower national economic growth rate "are
more serious since they appeared more suddenly. Japan's basic in-
dustries went from a period of very high growth into a period of
crisis quite suddenly, with little or no time to adjust to changed
conditions."
34
With respect to the complications caused by less automatically
adjusting industries, one commentator wrote:
Under these circumstances, workers, communities, and
companies facing economic changes that erode their competitive
positions often have no profitable alternative toward which to
shift their resources. Because the process of economic change
HAKUSHO (The White Papers of Japan) 421 (Nihon Joho Kyoiku Kenkyukai ed. 1988).
22. See JAPANESE WHITE PAPERS, supra note 7, at 144.
23. "The contribution of foreign demand to GNP growth weakened .... OECD esti-
mates suggest that growth in Japan's export markets fell from 13.3 per cent in 1984 to 5.6 per
cent in 1985." ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC
SURVEYS 1986/1987: JAPAN 15 (1986) [hereinafter OECD SURVEY].
24. Tanaka & Middleton, supra note 4, at 420.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 421.
27. The Japanese distribution system is characterized by a complex network involving
manufacturers/producers, wholesalers, retailers, and middlemen at every level. Both wholesale
and retail houses tend to be small and extremely numerous. Transactions "wind through long
chains of wholesalers," and a substantial number of sales are to other wholesalers. Caves &
Uekusa, Industrial Organization, in ASIA'S NEw GIANT, supra note 11, at 513-15.
28. See Economic Planning Agency, Economic White Paper, in JAPANESE WHITE PA-
PERS, supra note 7, at 126-27.
29. The primary sectors are agriculture, fisheries, and forestry. See BURKS, JAPAN: A
POSTINDUSTRIAL POWER 169 (2d ed. 1984).
30. The secondary sectors include mining, manufacturing, and construction. Id.
31. The tertiary sectors include public utilities, wholesale and retail trade, banking and
insurance, services, real estate, transportation and communications, and public administration.
Id.
32. According to one economic theory, the shift toward the tertiary sectors is a natural
process in economic evolution. Chenery, Patterns of Industrial Growth, 50 AM. EcON. REV.
624-54 (1960). Contra Rapp, supra note 15, at 71 ("[The basic manufacturing sectors'] de-
clining viability is neither inevitable nor desirable"). As a part of this process, stagnant indus-
tries must be streamlined in order to regain or maintain some of their former competitiveness,
or be phased out altogether. In doing so, the competitiveness of the emerging industries will be
enhanced and capital resources can be absorbed into the faster growing sectors for more profit-
able use. Reich, Making Industrial Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 852, 862-63 (1982).
33. See INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 8.
34. J. ABEGGLEN, supra note 11, at 81.
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may seriously threaten their future well-being, they turn to po-
litical devices designed to stem the tide, at least temporarily:
legislation to stop runaway plants, regulations to prohibit the in-
troduction of new technologies, government-financed bailouts.
But protections like these retard future economic growth by en-
cumbering the movement of resources toward more productive
uses and the downward cycle perpetuates itself.3 5
In order to prevent such a potentially vicious cycle from taking
place, Japan has concentrated on refining its industrial policies in a
way that will adequately address the problems confronting its less
competitive sectors. The actions of the Japanese shipbuilding indus-
try in the early 1970s are a good illustration of how concerted effort
and determination have eased an industry-wide employment adjust-
ment problem.
Following the oil crisis of 1973, world demand for ships and
particularly oil tankers had decreased drastically,"' and competition
from shipyards in the newly industrializing economies steadily
chipped away the competitive position held by the Japanese.3  As a
result, the industry was forced to make structural adjustments in its
capital equipment and labor force.38 By 1975 or 1976, the Japanese
government recognized the shipbuilding industry as "structurally de-
pressed,"3 9 and each company in the industry initiated substantial
adjustment programs. Employment was reduced or transferred to
other industries, and excess capacity in capital equipment was pur-
chased by a credit organization established under the guidelines of
the Structurally Depressed Industries Law. 0 Additional employment
adjustment measures in the form of temporary layoffs and solicita-
tion of early retirement were carried out by 1978.41 This type of ra-
35. Reich, supra note 32, at 852.
36. "The Japanese shipbuilding industry has enjoyed a large share of the world market
during the 1950s and 1960s ranging from 50 and 60 per cent in peak times, to 30 to 40 per
cent in recessed times . . .[After the oil crisis], the volume of demand dropped almost by half
between 1974 and 1978." Wilson, Labor Relations in the U.S. and Japan: The Role of the
Enterprise in Labor-Management Relations, 9 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 577, 616 (1987).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The Temporary Measures Law for the Stabilization of Specified Depressed Indus-
tries, Law No. 44 of 1978 [hereinafter Industries Law], defines a structurally depressed indus-
try as one which "registers projected permanent excess production capacity that must be re-
duced in view of its destabilizing effect." Art. 2, § 1.
The basic criteria for designating a particular industry as structurally depressed are:
(1) more than 50 per cent of the industry's firms experience financial
difficulties
(2) there is an unusual excess of production capacity; and
(3) two-thirds of that industry's members request such a designation.
Industries Law, art. 2, § 3.
40. Wilson, supra note 36, at 616-17. One of the measures which the Japanese govern-
ment took in 1977 to counter structural depression was to allow businesses in the depressed
industries to form "depression cartels." Saxonhouse, supra note 9, at 305-06.
41. Id. at 616.
[Vol. 7:3
JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT POLICY
tionalization of employment conditions in the shipbuilding industry
was relatively smooth in the larger Japanese companies owing to
"well-planned and carefully organized processes." '42 Smaller and me-
dium-sized companies, however, experienced more difficulties "due
to [sustained] union resistance, but [e]mployment was eventually re-
duced by the beginning of 1979. . .. "'I'
Although various problems confront declining industries, gener-
ally the problems are common to most, if not all, declining indus-
tries. The case of the shipbuilding industry demonstrates that unem-
ployment and employment adjustment are crucial factors which
must be taken into consideration when an industry is in decline and
a rationalization program is necessary for industrial revitalization.
B. Unemployment in Japan's Declining Industries
There are commonly held beliefs in the West that Japanese
workers are docile, subservient, and more eager to promote their
companies' interests rather than their own.4" Non-Japanese people
also tend to perceive Japanese enterprises as taking a pervasive and
paternalistic attitude toward their workers 45 and their employees' ac-
tivities. There is still much truth to these observations, but changing
economic conditions and the resultant structural reforms are begin-
ning to affect Japanese industrial relations at the most fundamental
levels. Particular problems such as unemployment' and other funda-
mental disruptions 47 which were previously obscured by Japan's ac-
complishments in the international marketplace are now coming to
the forefront as major socioeconomic concerns in Japan. 8
42. Id. at 617-18.
43. Id. at 618.
44. THE EcONOMIST, JAPAN 21 (1983).
45. R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN 2 (1976). "In con-
trast to Americans, Japanese are in fact more in favor of company paternalism, more identified
with their company, more likely to think employees should participate in its recreational activi-
ties .... " R. Marsh & H. Mannari, The 'Japanese Factory' Revised 3 (1973) (paper pre-
pared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association) (available
in the Dick. J. Int'l Law office).
46. A recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study
concluded that Japan's total employment has increased by a little less than 1 per cent per
annum since 1973, and that Japan maintains one of the lowest unemployment rates in the
world. OECD SURVEY, supra note 23, at 71-79.
The Japanese Ministry of Labor has also released statistics which show a drop in Japan's
unemployment rate from 3.1 percent in 1987 to 2.4 percent in July 1988. Kitamatsu, supra
note 1, at 1, col. 4. Despite the decrease in the overall unemployment rate, the figures are
deceptive: the decrease in unemployment occurred mostly in metropolitan areas which had
been suffering acute labor shortages; recession-hit smokestack regions still maintain an unem-
ployment rate higher than 3 percent. Id. at 5, col. 2.
47. Examples are in-company and out-company transfers, temporary layoffs, hiring
freezes, discharges of temporary workers, reductions in overtime, and early retirement. See
infra note 62.
48. See generally Dreyfus, Fear and Trembling in the Colossus, 115 FORTUNE 32, 32-
34 (Mar. 30, 1987); Sorrentino, Japanese Unemployment: BLS Updates Its Analysis, 110
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Industrial decline has profoundly affected two interrelated Japa-
nese employment characteristics: career or "permanent" employ-
ment, 9 and the seniority-based wage system. 0 The Japanese em-
ployment system which is based on these two attributes is of
relatively recent origin. 1 Scholars tend to agree that the system de-
veloped in the early twentieth century,52 and certainly after World
War I,13 and that it is the product of a conscious managerial policy
based on traditional cultural norms."' Japanese workers on the whole
have conformed to the practice of permanent employment "not be-
cause of any strongly held commitment to the [company] but be-
cause of economic reasons, desire for security, lack of alternatives,
age, and family ties."' 5
Prior to the energy crisis in 1973, employees of large Japanese
enterprises" could be reasonably assured of permanent employment
with their companies. Since "[tfhe pyramid-shaped age structure of
the population which pertained in the past featur[ed] masses of
young workers at the bottom and a relatively small group of workers
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 47 (June 1987); Armstrong, Japan's Newest Import: U.S.-Style Layoffs,
298 Bus. WK. 57 (Mar. 9, 1987); Roger, Now Japan Faces Unemployment, 34 WORLD PRESS
REV. 44 (Mar. 1987); and Land of Rising Unemployment, 115 FORTUNE 10 (Feb. 2, 1987).
49. Permanent employment refers to the Japanese practice of joining a company upon
completion of school or university and remaining with the same company until reaching the
retirement age of 55. R. COLE, WORK, MOBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION 11 (1979). See also
Crawcour, The Japanese Employment System, 4 J. JAPAN. STUD. 225 (1978). See generally
EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5, at 10-11.
50. Regarding the Japanese wage system, one author wrote:
whereas wage rates in Western countries are based essentially on occupational
skill, in Japan they are determined by the worker's age, length of service, and
occupational status (and, since World War 1I, his educational background). In
other words, the wage rates of Japanese permanent employees increase by an
annual increment that raises the wage of each individual according to his age
and length of service.
Funahashi, The Industrial Reward System: Wages and Benefits, in WORKERS AND EMPLOY-
ERS IN JAPAN 361, 362 (K. Okochi, B. Karsh & S. Levine eds. 1974) [hereinafter WORKERS &
EMPLOYERS IN JAPAN].
51. Crawcour, supra note 49, at 229.
52. Sumiya, The Emergence of Modern Japan, in WORKERS & EMPLOYERS IN JAPAN,
supra note 50, at 35; R. DORE, BRITISH FACTORY, JAPANESE FACTORY: THE ORIGINS OF NA-
TIONAL DIVERSITY IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 375-403 (1973).
53. B. RICHARDSON & T. UEDA, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY IN JAPAN: FUNDAMENTALS FOR
BUSINESSMEN 30 (1981) [hereinafter BUSINESS AND SOCIETY IN JAPAN].
54. Id. Cited among the motives of managerial policy are employers' desire to secure "a
steady supply of skilled and semi-skilled labor," Crawcour, supra note 49, at 229; and "to
operate at full or close to full capacity," C. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 13. See also R. COLE,
supra note 49, at 11-25.
55. R. COLE, supra note 49, at 20. Another commentator observed that the postwar
Japanese government's "failure to provide a really viable system of social security external to
the firm has also tended to support the lifetime employment system." Crawcour, supra note
49, at 244.
56. Career employment is not a universal concept in Japan. For example, the practice is
largely limited to big businesses in the private sector. It also does not generally apply to female
employees, temporary workers, and blue-collar labor. Cole, Permanent Employment, in BUSI-
NESS AND SOCIETY IN JAPAN, supra note 53, at 33.
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nearing retirement age" 7 at the top of the corporate hierarchy, pro-
motions and wages commensurate to length of service in the com-
pany took place in an orderly and somewhat predictable fashion.
The effects of the oil crisis, worldwide recession, and slower eco-
nomic growth, however, forced the Japanese employment system to
meet the realities of far-reaching changes in the nation's economic
structure. As a result of industrial decline, permanent employment
and its corollary, the seniority-based renumeration system, have in-
creasingly become troubled. The problem is basically two-fold.
First, the maintenance of the lifetime employment system has
put intense pressures on company operating costs.58 As company em-
ployees become older, their wages are raised. 59 In addition, Japan's
rapidly aging work force60 has become excessive and unproductive61
at the middle levels of the company hierarchy. Thus, businesses in
the declining sectors have had to face a nagging dilemma: Should
the customary permanent employment system be scrapped in favor
of attempting to keep the company financially afloat?6 Difficult de-
57. Ujihara, The Job Market for the Middle-aged, 33 JAPAN Q. 172, 174 (1986).
58. J. ABEGGLEN, supra note 11, at 82.
59. See WORKERS & EMPLOYERS IN JAPAN, supra note 50.
60. OECD SURVEY, supra note 46, at 79. The effect of an aging society on Japan's
labor forces is potentially grave when the changing population structure is taken into
consideration:
[Aiccording to projections by the Institute of Population Problems of the Minis-
try of Health and Welfare, persons over 65 years of age, a group that repre-
sented 10.1 per cent of the population in 1985, are expected to account for 20
per cent of the population by the year 2015. The aging of the population
presents a major problem for employers and employees alike; it is affecting the
entire employment and work renumeration system and will continue to do so in
the foreseeable future.
Ujihara, supra note 57, at 172.
61. Japanese employers tend to be reluctant to discharge their workers, even in times of
economic hardship. De Vos, Apprenticeship and Paternalism, in MODERN JAPANESE ORGANI-
ZATION AND DECISION-MAKING 223-27 (E. Vogel ed. 1975) [hereinafter JAPANESE ORGANI-
ZATION]. This partially explains the growth in the population of the so-called madogiwa-zoku
(literally, windowside people). This group contains middle-aged employees who outnumber the
limited positions available in the management hierarchy, but are nevertheless maintained on
the company payroll due to traditional reluctance to discharge workers. These workers come to
the office but remain mostly idle throughout the working day. See also Dreyfus, supra note 48,
at 32.
62. Japanese firms rely upon a greater combination of labor adjustment schemes than
Western firms. These schemes include:
1) restricting overtime hours;
2) making more use of the existing work force at the workshop;
3) reducing or stopping recruitment;
4) transferring idle labor from slack sections to busier sections of the firm;
5) transferring idle labor from a plant with a lower level of activity to one
with a higher level of activity;
6) transferring idle labor to subsidiaries or other companies;
7) temporarily laying off regular workers, usually with nearly full payment of
regular wages;
8) dismissing temporary workers;
9) soliciting early retirement; and
10) conducting selected designated dismissals.
J. ORR. H. SHIMADA & A. SEIDE, UNITED STATES-JAPAN COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EMPLOY-
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cisions are being made in reference to the permanent employment
system, vis-a-vis, the faltering viability of retaining workers on a
long-term basis and paying larger salaries each year to an ever-in-.
creasing number of aging employees. This dilemma is likely to con-
tinue in the future.
Second, as the industrial base shifts toward the "knowledge-in-
tensive" tertiary industries,63 the problem of adjusting workers from
the manufacturing industries to new jobs involving growth-oriented
high-technology arises. In many cases, the workers do not possess the
requisite skill and education to become fully productive in a tertiary
industry. As one author noted, it would be feasible to convert a ship-
yard worker into an autoworker but transferring that same worker to
a job in computers, biotechnology, or fiber optics would be difficult,
if not impossible.64
The need to formulate and implement policies which will pro-
vide unemployed workers in the depressed industries with education,
retraining, and opportunities for re-employment will continue as long
as stagnant industries are not overhauled and adapted to the chang-
ing economy. Japan has already experienced some success in this
area, especially at encouraging retraining and relocating workers and
extending government subsidies and other incentives, such as tax
benefits and loans," to companies in the troubled sectors. Policy-
makers, however, should also place equal emphasis on long-range
goals. Such goals include improving the labor market for older work-
ers66 and assisting displaced employees in adjusting to an economy
that is becoming more and more multi-faceted and specialized. 7
III. Policy Responses to Unemployment in Japan's Declining
Industries
Many literary works on Japan extol the Japanese government's
achievements in adjustment assistance and the measures it has taken
to reach its objectives.68 The Japanese government must be accorded
due credit for its accomplishments, but the net effect of all the praise
gives the illusion that the government's actions have been unilateral
in nature and that Japanese industry merely follows the govern-
MENT ADJUSTMENT 6 (1985) [hereinafter J. ORR].
63. See supra note 31.
64. Uriu, supra note 4, at I i0.
65. See infra note 121.
66. Ujihara, supra note 57, at 174.
67. Ministry of Labor, Labor White Paper, in JAPANESE WHITE PAPERS, supra note 7,
at 510.
68. See generally, THE ECONOMIST, supra note 44, at 18; Tanaka & Middleton, supra
note 4; Boyer, supra note 4; INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 8; Comment, Letting
Obsolete Firms Die: Trade Adjustment Assistance in the United States and Japan, 22 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 595 (1981); and Uriu, supra note 4.
[Vol. 7:3
JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT POLICY
ment's wishes. Such an impression would be an inaccurate portrayal
of industrial relations in Japan today. On the contrary, Japanese
business and government have maintained a relationship which is
necessarily bilateral and mutually beneficial. Moreover, individual
segments of the Japanese industrial world have played important
roles in the policy formulation process and, ultimately, contributed
to the successful implementation of adjustment policy. 9
A. The Policy-Making Process
Article 41 of the Japanese Constitution (Kenpo) provides that
the Diet 0 "shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be
the sole law-making organ of the State."'" However, "the Diet exer-
cises its law-making power in a formal rather than a creative
sense" 72 since legislative proposals typically originate within the bu-
reaucracy rather than within the Diet itself.73 This process is com-
monly known as ringi-sei (ringi system). 4
The ringi system is a uniquely Japanese decision making proce-
dure. It is a complex process that incorporates many of Japan's so-
cial values and functions along the lines of typical Japanese social
behavior. Ringi-sei is broadly described as
the approval-seeking process where a proposal (ringi-sho) pre-
pared by a lower functionary works itself up through the organi-
zation hierarchy in a highly circuitous, snail-paced manner; at
each step it is examined by the proper officials, whose approval
is indicated by affixing a seal, and somehow a decision emerges
from the process.
75
More specifically, the process involves the following basic steps:
69. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
70. The Diet is a bicameral legislature which was patterned after the Western European
model. Trezise & Suzuki, Politics, Government, and Economic Growth in Japan, in ASIA'S
NEw GIANT, supra note 11, at 757. The Diet is composed of the 491-member lower House of
Representatives and the 252-member upper House of Councillors, pursuant to KENPU (Consti-
tution) art. 42 (Japan). The Diet is also "chosen under a franchise that is universal for citizens
aged twenty-one and over." Id. at 758.
71. KENPU art. 41. See also Kok'kaiho (Diet Law), Law No. 79 of 1947, translated in I
EIBUN-HUREI-SHA (EHS) L. BULL. SERIES CA.
72. Bendix, Interaction of Business and Government in Japan: Lessons for the United
States?, 15 INT'L LAw. 571, 572 (1981). See also Craig, Functional and Dysfunctional As-
pects of Government Bureaucracy, in JAPANESE ORGANIZATION, supra note 61, at 21.
73. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
74. Ringi-sei is generally defined as "the system whereby documents are drafted at
lower levels of an organization and then circulated to various units for approval." Vogel, Intro-
duction: Toward More Accurate Concepts, in JAPANESE ORGANIZATION, supra note 61, at
xvii.
75. Yoshino, Emerging Japanese Multinational Enterprises, in JAPANESE ORGANIZA-
TION, supra note 61, at 158.
Note that this decision-making procedure is similar in both the business and government
settings. See generally Noda, Big Business Organization, in JAPANESE ORGANIZATION, supra
note 61, at 115-45.
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1. Initiation of a draft idea by an official in the top levels of
a bureaucracy.
2. Drafting of the bill in the section (ka) that has responsi-
bility for the matter. Informal discussions take place within the
section, and there are consultations with other concerned offices.
3. Consultations and meetings to revise the draft and to
gather support76 and approval for it.
4. Circulation of the completed document up and down
through the concerned offices for seals of approval by the office
chiefs until the draft reaches the office of the vice-minister.
77
5. Submission of the ringi-sho to the minister for considera-
tion by the cabinet78 or submission to the Diet.
79
The advantage of the ringi system is that it allows for great
flexibility and informality in the decision-making process. Consulta-
tion80 occurs at all levels within the bureaucracy, and a consensus for
the proposal is gradually built up as the draft is circulated through
the various offices. During this complicated, time-consuming proce-
dure, it is possible to "take into account diverse points of view from
both the public and private sectors." 81 As one commentator ob-
served, the process "enables various constituencies affected by the
proposed legislation to provide input in a largely non-adversarial
setting."82
The private sectors are able to participate in the ringi system by
means of the shingikai (advisory commission).8" The shingikai are
"official standing organs created by a minister and composed of civil-
ian experts selected by him to inquire into and discuss policies and
proposed legislation of his ministry."" The civilian experts are usu-
ally representatives of various interests such as business, labor, in-
dustry, academia, and the mass media. 85 The purpose of the sh-
76. Bendix, supra note 72, at 572.
77. For a discussion on the scope of the vice-minister's powers, see Ojimi, A Government
Ministry: The Case of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, in JAPANESE OR-
GANIZATION, supra note 61, at 111-12.
78. The Cabinet is the executive branch of the Japanese government, KENPO art. 65. It
consists of "the Prime Minister, who shall be its head, and other Ministers of State ...." art.
66(3). See also Naikakuhna (Cabinet Law), Law No. 5 of 1947, translated in I EHS L. BULL.
SERIES EA.
79. Craig, supra note 72, at 21.
80. Also known as nemawashi (literally, "binding the roots of a plant before pulling it
out"). Vogel, supra note 74, at xxii. The practice of broad consultation in Japan has the effect
of making the participants feel that they are an integral part of the decision-making process;
consequently, there is likely to be greater support for the decision and more willingness to
implement it. Id. at xxiii.
81. Bendix, supra note 72, at 573.
82. "Id.
83. See Curtis, Big Business and Political Influence, in JAPANESE ORGANIZATION, supra
note 61, at 43-44.
84. C. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 49.
85. Passin, Intellectual in the Decision-Making Process, in JAPANESE ORGANIZATION,
supra note 61, at 251-68.
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ingikai is to "provide an open forum for the discussion of differences
so that a consensus can emerge and a generally acceptable recom-
mendation [be] made to the appropriate ministry."' 6 It should be
noted, however, that although the members of a shingikai are at-
tached to a particular ministry, they do not play a part in the actual
decision-making process; their role is merely consultative.87
Thus, consultation takes place at two levels in the decision-mak-
ing process for the purpose of achieving consensus for a certain pol-
icy: within the bureaucracy itself and in conjunction with the shin-
gikai. The result is a flexible and democratic way of making
decisions that affect the country as a whole. This flexibility is espe-
cially significant for Japan's declining industries and for pressing is-
sues such as employment adjustment, because it has allowed Japa-
nese policy-makers to formulate rational strategies capable of being
adapted to current economic realities and at the same time widely
accepted by the affected interests.
B. The Japanese Approach to Unemployment in the Declining
Sectors
Scholars of Japan often point out that Japan's comparatively
active stance in economic policy has derived from the self-recogni-
tion that international trade is crucial to the country's survival.88 Ja-
pan's dependence on foreign trade requires careful allocation and
consumption of its resources in order to obtain the maximum possi-
ble benefit. Such a requirement calls for centralized planning and
policy implementation that are comprehensive.89
Generally, Japan has approached industrial decline and its con-
86. Upham, supra note 4, at 460.
87. Id. at 461.
88. The most striking characteristic of Japan that influences its economic relations with
other countries is its almost negligible domestic sources of raw materials. "The natural re-
sources such as petroleum, iron ore, coal, and nonferrous ores required for a modern economy
must be imported ...Furthermore, with only limited arable land relative to its population,
Japan also imports a substantial proportion of its foodstuffs ...." Krause & Sekiguchi,
supra note 13, at 386. "In order to provide for its barest necessities, Japan has had to look
outward to other nations through international trade." Bendix, supra note 72, at 573.
89. See generally INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, and Tanaka & Middleton,
supra note 4, at 433-34.
There has been criticism that Japan's tendency for central planning might not be as effec-
tive as is usually thought. See, e.g., Gatti, supra note 3, at 184, 186:
Japanese planning . . . leaves much to be desired ...A planning commission
that makes forecasts to which nobody pays attention is not what we have in
mind. . . . [T]he evidence suggests that calls for a greater degree of central eco-
nomic planning must be regarded with far more skepticism than is currently
being shown in many quarters. On logical grounds alone one is forced to ask
whether any central decision-making body is capable of generating and dissemi-
nating information in the quantity and of the quality that the market can
produce.
Id. at 186, citing Sharpe, The Planning Bill, in THE POLTICS OF PLANNING 9 (A.L. Chicker-
ing ed. 1976).
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comitant problems-in this case unemployment-in an entirely dif-
ferent manner than that of the United States. In sharp contrast to
the American microeconomic approach,90 Japanese policy centers
around macroeconomic planning.9' This process relies on what is
known as "indicative planning," 92 whereby the Economic Planning
Agency (EPA) 93 assesses factors including trade growth projections,
gross national product, production, prices, consumption, government
income and expenditure, and deficits.' The EPA then makes general
policy recommendations based on its findings.95 The importance of
the EPA's planning lies in the fact that "[t]he plans serve to achieve
national consensus96 on long-term goals and the direction in which
the economy should head. Cabinet approval of the plans gives them
further meaning in a broad national sense."9
One of the results of this slow and deliberate planning appara-
tus is a comprehensive approach98 to the problem of employment ad-
justment. 99 This approach is made possible by two related factors.
90. "American policy is minimalist, fragmented, and negative, focusing on ...
microeconomic .. .problems." Tanaka & Middleton, supra note 4, at 433.
91. Macroeconomic planning concerns setting projections of economic growth and gen-
eral goals for the economy. INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, at ii. See also Lansing
& Rose, The Japanese Industrial Policy Complex: An Appropriate Legal Model for the
United States?, II BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 237, 261-63 (1985).
92. INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, at 22-23.
93. The Japanese Economic Planning Agency (EPA) "has come to be known as a 'col-
ony agency' or a 'branch store of MITI.' It has no operating functions, but only writes reports
... EPA's forecasts and indicative plans are read not so much for their accuracy or
econometric sophistication as for official statements of what industries the government is pre-
pared to finance or guarantee for the immediate future." C. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 76. The
EPA is an independent, noncabinet agency attached to the prime minister's office and is
headed by an appointed minister of state (kokumu daijin). Id.
For a brief discussion on the EPA, see UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION, FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL TARGETING AND ITS EFFECTS ON U.S. INDUSTRIES, PHASE I: JAPAN
57 (Oct. 1983).
94. INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, at 3-4.
95. Id. at 23.
96. The basic premise for consensus in Japan is the wide-spread belief that negotiated
solutions are superior to conflicts. Lansing & Rose, supra note 91, at 258. It is also believed
that cooperation and mutual approval by all parties concerned will foster greater commitment
to the implementation of a decision. See supra note 80.
Consensus, therefore, has evolved into a great social virtue and is an integral part of
Japanese thought and behavior; its development was undoubtedly enhanced by Japan's geo-
graphic cohesiveness and ethnic homogeneity. Consensus is sought to promote cooperation and
to preserve social harmony in any type of setting, be it family, school, business, or government.
The Japanese "consensus economy," in which "cooperation between government, industry and
labor continues as the central focus," is one of many reflections of this fundamental character-
istic. Lansing & Rose, supra note 91, at 280-81.
97. INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, at 3-4.
98. Id. at 66-72. See also Tanaka & Middleton, supra note 4, at 433-35.
99. Employment adjustment has been broadly defined as the continuing process of "allo-
cating and reallocating workers among jobs in response to changing market conditions." J.
ORR, supra note 62, at 6. The relative flexibility that a society in general, or a firm in particu-
lar, has in adjusting its labor force is intimately related to the structure of its internal labor
market. A variety of background factors determine the shape and efficiency of internal labor
markets. Variables such as the historical pattern of industrial development and union evolu-
tion, the rate of economic growth, and the relative heterogeneity and dispersed structure of
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The first is that the Japanese policy-makers are cognizant of the im-
portance of national consensus in pursuing its intended policy objec-
tives. 100 In other words, they are aware that it is in the national in-
terest to cooperate with business and industry, especially with regard
to the growing unemployment problems in the declining industries.
Consequently, Japan's economic goals cannot be readily carried out
without the support and approval of those sectors. The second factor
is that because the Japanese government, particularly the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI),1°' strongly encourages
"coordinated joint action between government and industry," 102 it is
willing to consult with and obtain the consent of the interested par-
ties in the course of the decision-making process.103
These two factors, the necessity for and promotion of consensus-
based government-industry relations, provided considerable flexibility
in Japan's approach to employment adjustment in the structurally
depressed industries.'" Flexibility was further obtained from the na-
ture of Japanese industrial policy 10 5 itself, which tends to be pur-
posefully broad in order to be adaptable to dynamic economic condi-
tions.10 6 Concerned parties such as unemployed workers in declining
industries are given an opportunity to take advantage of the provi-
sions offered them through the government's flexible and comprehen-
sive approach, including, but not limited to, relief through employ-
industries, population, and labor markets have all influenced the characteristics of Japanese
and American employment adjustment. Id. at 13-16.
100. Craig, supra note 72, at 27-30.
101. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry, also known as MITI, along with
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), is the chief government organ with the responsibility for
economic decision-making in Japan. For a general discussion of MITI and its historical devel-
opment, see C. JOHNSON, supra note 3; for a review of MITI and the decision-making process,
see Ojimi, supra note 77.
102. Lansing & Rose, supra note 91, at 267.
103. Curtis, supra note 83, at 44.
104. See infra notes 110-31.
105. There is a view that industrial policy "is an indigenous Japanese term not to be
found in the lexicon of Western economic terminology..." Ozaki, Japanese Views on Indus-
trial Organization, 10 ASIAN SURV. 872, 879 (1970). The author further pointed out that
"industrial policy"
refers to a complex of those policies concerning protection of domestic industries,
development of strategic industries, and adjustment of the economic structure in
response to or in anticipation of internal and external changes which are formu-
lated and pursued by MITI in the cause of the national interest, as the term
"national interest" is understood by MITI officials.
Id.
From another point of view, industrial policy is said to be composed of two elements,
"corresponding to the micro and macro aspects of the economy .... " C. JOHNSON, supra
note 3, at 27. The first element is "industrial rationalization policy" (sangy- g7rika seisaku),
which refers to "state intrusion into the detailed operations of individual enterprises with mea-
sures intended to improve those operations (or, on occasion, to abolish the enterprise)." Id. The
second element is called "industrial structure policy" (sangy-O koza seisaku), which concerns
changing the proportions of the various industrial sectors in the nation's total production in
ways the government considers advantageous to the nation. Id. at 28.
106. Trezise & Suzuki, supra note 70, at 808-11.
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ment-related legislation. 107
C. The Legal Bases of Employment Adjustment in Japan
Japan possesses a policy-making system that is capable of spec-
ulating on what might happen in the future, while at the same time,
being able to discern what must be done for the present. Because the
Japanese legal system, 108 like Japanese industrial policy, incorpo-
rates many cultural and societal norms 09 and reflects Japanese be-
havioral patterns, it has great capacity to take changing economic
conditions into consideration. Based on this foundation, Japanese
policymakers have developed an innovative approach to the current
problem of employment adjustment in the declining industries.
One method which unemployed workers in the declining indus-
tries can utilize to obtain relief is action through the medium of leg-
islation.' The Diet's most favorable, reaction to economic change
and its effects on industrial workers has been the enactment of two
special laws: the Temporary Measures Law Governing Unemployed
Workers in Specified Depressed Industries (Employees Law)'" and
the Temporary Measures Law Governing Unemployed Workers in
Specified Depressed Areas (Depressed Areas Law). 12 This Com-
ment significantly focuses on the first law, which expired in 1983 and
was continued by the substantially similar Special Measure Law
Governing Employment Stabilization for Workers in Specified De-
pressed Industries (Employment Stabilization Law)."
The Employees Law provided the legal basis for employment
adjustment in Japan and operated in conjunction with the Employ-
ment Insurance Law."" The purpose of the Employees Law was to
107. See infra notes 108-29 and accompanying text.
108. See generally E. HAHN, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1986);
J.O. HALEY, CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA (1978).
109. Lansing & Rose, supra note 91, at 239.
110. Other methods which labor interests can employ are collective bargaining with em-
ployers, participation in union activities, and direct political action. For an in-depth analysis,
see R. COLE, JAPANESE BLUE. COLLAR (1971); R. COLE, supra note 49; and Rippey, Alterna-
tives to the U.S. System of Labor Relations: A Comparative Analysis of the Labor Relations
Systems in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Sweden, 41 VAND. L. REV. 627-58
(1988).
111. Tokutei fukyU gyushu rishokusha rinji sochiho (Temporary Measures Law Gov-
erning Unemployed Workers in Specified Depressed Industries), Law No. 95 of 1977 [herein-
after Employees Law].
112. Tokutei fukyo chiiki rishokusha rinji sochiho (Temporary Measures Law Governing
Unemployed Workers in Specified Depressed Areas), Law No. 197 of 1978 [hereinafter De-
pressed Areas Law].
113. Tokutei fukyu gyushu kankei rodosha no koyu no antei ni kansuru tokubetsu
sochiho (Special Measures Law Governing Employment Stabilization for Workers in Specified
Depressed Industries), Law No. 39 of 1983 [hereinafter Employment Stabilization Law].
114. Koyo hokenho (Employment Insurance Law), Law No. 116 of 1974, translated in
8 EHS L. BULL. SERIES HB. Although the Employees Law, supra note 111, does not expressly
provide for employment adjustment in conjunction with the Employment Insurance Law, the
purposes and procedures for obtaining unemployment benefits under both laws are strikingly
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assist in the transfer of excess labor out of the declining industries.'"
It was also designed to extend Japan's general unemployment system
to include unemployed workers in designated declining industries."16
Under the Employees Law, an unemployed worker was required to
participate in government retraining and relocation programs in or-
der to qualify for the unemployment benefits provided by law." 7 The
"worker [was required to] report to the local Public Employment
Security Office, which certifi[ed] his unemployed status," 8 and
[there] he indicat[ed] his willingness to take a job assigned to him,
and the government in turn attempt[ed] to find him a job.""19 Re-
fusal to accept a job assigned by the Public Employment Security
Office would have cost the worker his right to basic unemployment
allowances. 20 The Employees Law also provided special allowances
for workers who had been discharged from industries certified in ad-
vance by the government as structurally depressed.' 2 ' Furthermore,
"[t]hose workers .. .over forty years old receiv[ed] special exten-
sions of the Employment Insurance Law benefits,"' and employers
who retrain[ed,] rather than discharg[ed, their] workers receiv[ed]
subsidies."' 23
With respect to unemployed workers in communities affected by
declining industries, 24 "the government hoped both to establish [dif-
ferent] industries in the [area] and to provide assistance to displaced
workers."" 15 For the period in which the Employee Law remained in
similar. Note, however, that the Employment Stabilization Law does expressly provide for the
operation of the law in connection with the Employment Insurance Law. Employment Stabili-
zation Law, supra note 113, at art. 9, § 1.
115. Uriu, supra note 4, at 101.
116. Comment, supra note 68, at 605. Note that Japan's current unemployment system
is modeled after early postwar legislation such as Shitsugyu hokenhu (Unemployment Insur-
ance Law), Law No. 146 of 1947, translated in 8 EHS L. BULL. SERIES HA, repealed by Law
No. 116 of 1974, appended art. 2; and Shokugyu anteiho (Employment Security Law), Law
No. 141 of of 1947, translated in 8 EHS L. BULL. SERIES GA.
117. Comment, supra note 68, at 605. As part of his unemployment benefits, an unem-
ployed worker could receive an employment promotion allowance and other expenses such as
training allowances. EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 5, at 24. See also Employment Insur-
ance Law, supra note 114, at art. 10.
118. In order to become an eligible beneficiary of the basic allowances provided by the
Employment Insurance Law, supra note 114, an unemployed worker must "obtain the recogni-
tion of the fact of being unemployed," art. 15, § 2 and "appear in the Public Employment
Security Office and apply for employment." Id.
119. Comment, supra note 68, at 605-06. See also Employees Law, supra note 111, at
art. 4 and Employment Stabilization Law, supra note 113, at art. 11.
120. Employment Insurance Law, supra note 114, at art. 32.
121. Employees Law, supra note 111, at arts. 1, 7, and 9; and Employment Stabilization
Law, supra note 113, at art. 4.
122. Employees Law, supra note 111, at art. 18. See also Employment Stabilization
Law, supra note 113, at art. 19.
123. Comment, supra note 68, at 606-07. See also Employees Law, supra note 111, at
art. 5 and Employment Insurance Law, supra note 113, at art. 61, § 2, cl. 2.
124. "Communities to be aided were designated as such by cabinet order." Comment,
supra note 68, at 608. See also Depressed Areas Law, supra note 112, at art. 2, § 1.
125. Depressed Areas Law, supra note 112, at art. 1.
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force, the benefits provided
[flor firms in [depressed] areas includ[ed] low-interest loans,
loan guarantees, extensions of existing loans, and tax advan-
tages . .26 For workers in these areas, the law provid[ed] the
already familiar benefits of training and job search assistance
127
The provision for indirect employment adjustment assistance in
the form of offering subsidies to employers who retrained rather than
fired their employees is particularly appealing because it is consistent
with traditional Japanese employment practices."' 8 Such a provision
also has the effect of "encourag[ing] the long-term employment rela-
tionships characteristic of Japanese business, while it assure[s] an
efficient distribution of the work force throughout the economy. "129
It is, after all, in an enterprise's interest to retrain its excess work
force so that the workers can be productive in other sectors in the
company or industry, rather than to discharge its employees in favor
of temporary or lower-cost workers, 130 or to allow its surplus regular
workers to remain idle.
Japan's employment adjustment programs have been deemed
effective because
by tying the program's benefits to the worker's participation, the
legislation allows the government to offer positive incentives in
order to shift human resources into competitive areas of the
economy, and by authorizing placement and training facilities,
the legislation enables the government to relocate workers from
obsolete to growth-oriented industries on a nation-wide scale.
Moreover, by incorporating these elements into its basic unem-
ployment package rather than as a special . . . adjustment pro-
gram, the drafters of the law gave the government the option of
training and placing workers displaced by changes in the na-
tional-as well as international-economic structure. 13'
The government's replacement of the Employees Law with the
Employment Stabilization Law in 1983132 which was designed to en-
126. Comment, supra note 68, at 608. See also Tokutei fukyu chiiki chushn kigyD
taisaku rinji sochiho (Temporary Measures Law Governing the Countermeasures for Small
and Medium-sized Industries in Specified Depressed Areas), Law No. 106 of 1978, arts. 4, 5,
6, and 7.
127. Comment, supra note 68, at 608.
128. Note that such a provision also promotes the Japanese worker's constitutional right
to employment. KENPO art. 27. ("All people shall have the right and the obligation to work").
129. Lansing & Rose, supra note 91, at 270.
130. It should be noted that temporary or lower-cost workers, typically female workers
or younger workers, are not paid at rates equivalent to regular, full-time company employees.
See Ministry of Labor, White Paper on the Employment of Women, in JAPANESE WHITE
PAPERS, supra note 7.
131. Comment, supra note 68, at 607.
132. See supra text accompanying note 113.
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hance the overall effectiveness and rationality of Japan's employ-
ment adjustment program, provided a successful implementation of a
comprehensive approach to problems associated with industrial de-
cline. The question remains, however, as to whether this approach
has adequately addressed the specific concerns of unemployed work-
ers in structurally depressed industries. There are many reasons
which suggest that it has not.
IV. A Re-evaluation of Japan's Approach to Employment Adjust-
ment in the Declining Industries
The legal mechanisms which merged the specific problem of un-
employment in the declining industries into the broader framework
of the national unemployment system afforded a viable foundation
for long-range policy implementation. In the short run, however, it is
by no means certain that the Japanese unemployment legislation has
extended adequate relief to the growing number of workers displaced
by industrial decline. This is because the law and the government
organs which administered the programs provided by the Employees
Law were ill-equipped to deal with the short-term needs of certain
unemployed workers in Japan's "sunset" industries.
A. The Incomplete Nature of Japanese Unemployment Legislation
in the Context of Industrial Decline
The 1977 Employees Law' 33 was enacted in response to the in-
creasing problems encountered by employees in the troubled indus-
tries following the oil crisis in 1973.' M The Employees Law was also
designed to continue the adjustment assistance guidelines established
under the Employment Insurance Law. 35 Both laws, however, con-
tained some inadequacies which did not facilitate effective employ-
ment adjustment.
First, the Employment Insurance Law was not a universal law.
Under article 3, the Diet authorized the government to engage in
projects concerned with employment stabilization, abilities develop-
ment, and employment welfare in addition to providing basic unem-
ployment benefits.'" 6 Although the law provided such programs for
unemployed industrial workers who worked on a full-time basis
before being separated from their companies, it did not apply to day
laborers, 37 seasonal workers, 3 8 or mariners. 39 Furthermore, the
133. See supra note 111.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 11-27.
135. See supra note 114.
136. Employment Insurance Law, supra note 114, at art. 3.
137. Id. at art. 6(l).
138. Id. at art. 6(2).
139. Id. at art. 6(3). Note, however, that the Diet passed a law in 1977 to assist unem-
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Employment Insurance Law was unclear as to the persons to whom
it did apply. For example, except as provided for in article 7, the law
did not expressly mention subcontractors4 0 or temporary workers'"
who did not fall under the classification of "day laborers" or "sea-
sonal workers." This ambiguity is disturbing because subcontractors
and temporary laborers constitute a substantial percentage of Ja-
pan's industrial work force,14 and in times of hardship, these types
of workers are likely to be adversely affected as much as full-time
company employees.
Subcontractors and temporary workers present a serious prob-
lem since they do not have access to alternative employment oppor-
tunities like those given to regular company workers.' 43 Because they
are not employed as workers of a given company, subcontractors and
temporary workers cannot be transferred to higher-growth sectors
within the business or to an affiliated enterprise, nor can they benefit
from employer-initiated employment adjustment programs.' 4 Legis-
lation that covers all classes of workers who are unfavorably affected
by industrial decline is necessary in order for Japan's approach to
employment adjustment to be truly comprehensive and flexible.
Second, the Employees Law provided unemployed workers with
allowances for job searching and training from the Employment Sta-
bilization Fund, 45 pursuant to article 22 of the Employment Insur-
ance Law. Eligibility to receive unemployment benefits for a fixed
period of time was determined by factors such as age and the num-
ber of days a worker had been continuously unemployed in a de-
pressed industry."'O Extensions of the period of time in which an un-
employed worker could receive benefits were available only in certain
restricted circumstances.4 7 This rigid scheme suggests that the Jap-
ployed mariners. Sen'in no koyo no sokushin ni kansuru rinji sochiho (Temporary Measures
Law to Promote the Employment of Mariners), Law No. 96 of 1977.
140. "[A] large proportion of small manufacturers function as subcontractors of larger
(often very large) manufacturing firms. Many subcontractors are wholly dependent on a single
buyer . . . ." R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, supra note 45, at 107.
141. "Temporary workers are taken on for specific, relatively short periods of time,
though they may be rehired. They may be doing the same work as regular employees or spe-
cial work . . . . [They] cannot be members of the enterprise unions, [because union status is]
normally reserved for regular workers." Galenson & Odaka, The Japanese Labor Market, in
ASIA'S NEw GIANT, supra note 11, at 619.
142. Id. at 619-20.
143. See supra note 62.
144. INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, at 75.
145. The Employment Stabilization Fund is a sum set aside from the national budget
for employment adjustment purposes, and its distribution is regulated pursuant to Shokugyo
Kunrenho (Employment Training Law), Law No. 64 of 1969, art. 99.
146. Employment Insurance Law, supra note 114, at art. 20.
147. Id. at art. 20, § 1. The fixed period during which workers could receive unemploy-
ment benefits could have been extended by the number of days a worker remained unemployed
(not including the 30 days required to trigger this provision) as a result of "pregnancy, child-
birth, upbringing or other reason prescribed by [a] Ministry of Labor Ordinance . I..." d
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anese unemployment policy of the late 1970s and early 1980s was
relatively inflexible. The law could have established a system
whereby any unemployed worker in any depressed industry would
not be denied a full opportunity to participate in government-spon-
sored employment adjustment programs solely because they could
not meet the article 20 requirements for extensions to receive bene-
fits. Perhaps the administration of the Employees Law would have
been more effective if the Public Employment Security Offices had
been granted the power to determine a worker's eligibility to receive
extended unemployment benefits on a case-by-case basis." 8
Third, the utility and effectiveness of the administration of the
programs established pursuant to the Employees Law and Employ-
ment Insurance Law have not been concretely ascertained. 14 9 A
study by one author suggested that the Japanese government may
not have been an effective administrator of the employment adjust-
ment projects:150
One indicator of the peripheral role of government policy is that
the budgets for its unemployment programs have not been over-
whelming: in 1978, of the one trillion yen ($4.2 billion) that was
allocated to the Ministry of Labor's unemployment programs,
only 1.1 per cent was allocated for labor in the depressed indus-
tries, and a mere 0.8 per cent ($33.3 million) was spent for re-
training and placement programs. Furthermore . . . [a]ccording
to a 1978 survey by the Trade Union Council for Policy Promo-
tion, only 6.2 per cent of those surveyed had received the ex-
tended unemployment benefits, 3.6 per cent the retraining bene-
fits, and 15.6 per cent compensation from the Employees Law
... . In fact, a surprising number of the respondents indicated
that they were unaware that these programs even existed.'51
Japan's employment adjustment programs, during the Employ-
ees Law period, could have been more successful had they been ad-
ministered as the drafters of the law had envisioned. It is difficult to
speculate what will happen during the current wave of unemploy-
ment in the declining sectors regarding the administration of em-
ployment adjustment programs. Since the Employment Stabilization
Law lapsed in June 1988, it is uncertain as to whether a similar law
has been enacted by the Diet. Substantial changes in policy guide-
lines may be necessary to take into account contemporary economic
148. The Japanese government and the Public Employment Security Offices are under
the duty to promote the re-employment of unemployed workers in the depressed industries.
Employees Law, supra note 111, at art. 4. Thus, the granting of more discretion to the Public
Employment Security Offices in determining workers' eligibility to receive unemployment ben-
efits would have been proper under the Employees Law.
149. Ike, The Japanese Textile Industry, 20 ASIAN SURV. 532, 549-50 (1980).
150. Id.
151. Uriu, supra note 4, at 108.
Spring 1989]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
conditions which may or may not be different in nature from those
which were present after the energy crisis in the mid-1970s. To this
end, clear-cut legislation and government regulations setting forth
specific procedural matters, for example, publicizing the availability
of and allocating program funds to deserving unemployed workers,
may help to overcome several problems in this area.
B. Weaknesses in the Japanese Bureaucracy's Position Regarding
Employment Adjustment
Successful policy implementation hinges on bureaucratic effi-
ciency and authority to carry out the goals of the policy. The Japa-
nese government, especially MITI and the Ministry of Labor
(MOL), has taken a more active and direct stance towards contem-
porary industrial problems by "providing a forum for mediation,
consensus and cooperation, as well as positive material incentives." '152
In doing so, "[it] has succeeded in cushioning some of the adjust-
ment costs for industry and labor; in the process, it has certainly
hastened adjustment."15 In spite of the government's achievements
in the field of economic policy, some Japanese government organs
have been losing the control that they had previously exercised over
business, industry and labor. The power bases of Japan's economic
ministries are proving to be increasingly vulnerable; this is a trend
which has had a bearing on the effective implementation of employ-
ment adjustment policy. Several factors are responsible for this
development.
First, Japanese economic bureaucracies have, in effect, become
victims of their own broad administrative discretion. This phenome-
non has been caused by the ministries' loss of influence over the Diet
and industry. "As a review of almost any legislation 'relating to the
economy reveals, the Diet almost invariably delegates broad author-
ity to the bureaucracy to formulate policy and to enforce it by [in-
formal] means. [During Japan's period of rapid economic growth,]
the Diet [did not] limit the bureaucracy's authority and the bureau-
cracy [did] not [press] for stronger, more effective enforcement
power. '54 One scholar explained the changing situation in terms of
a balance-of-power analysis:
Although the Japanese bureaucracy during the postwar era has
exerted a remarkable influence within the ruling Liberal Demo-
152. Id.
153. Haley, Administrative Guidance versus Formal Regulation: Resolving the Para-
dox of Industrial Policy, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 118 (G.
Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura eds. 1986).
154. id.
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cratic Party (LDP) 1" its position has been fragile. The political
influence of MITI and the other economic ministries has de-
pended perhaps foremost upon a national consensus giving over-
riding priority to economic growth as well as on the delicate bal-
ance within the LDP between party politicians and former
bureaucrats, conflicting claims by rival ministries, and the sup-
port of various economic interests-the "client" industries of
each economic ministry. The influence of the national bureau-
cracy as a whole has never translated into sufficient political
power to gain whatever it desired . . . . The consequence has
been the incapacity of MITI or any other ministry to extract
significant enforcement powers from the Diet.'
56
The same writer cited the ministries' repeated efforts "to have the
Diet enact legislation to weaken antitrust enforcement in the late
1950s and the Designated Industries Promotion Special Measures
bill 157 in the early 1960s [as an example of] the inability of the eco-
nomic bureaucracies to override industry opposition to any increase
in bureaucratic power."
1 5
Second, the failure of the Japanese economic ministries to ob-
tain substantial legal enforcement power from the legislature com-
pelled their increased reliance on extra-legal measures. 159 These in-
formal means of law enforcement lacked force and became a less
effective form of law enforcement because they had virtually no for-
mal support. 6 The paucity of formal legal control and the ubiquity
of informal means in their stead"' created conditions under which
interest groups, such as unemployed labor forces, could take advan-
tage of being unrestricted by formal procedures in the decision-mak-
ing process." 2 In fact, the government's inability to enforce its
guidelines through formal measures have appeared to work to the
interest groups' advantage: interest groups stood to gain more from
informal bargaining processes than formalized ones.'
Third, there has been a widening gap in the political power of
declining and emerging industries."6 4 "Historically, the declining,
noncompetitive industries have placed the heaviest political demands
on government, mainly in the form of measures to insulate them-
155. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is the right-of-center, pro-business and pro-
agriculture political party which has been in power for over thirty consecutive years since its
inception in 1955. Trezise & Suzuki, supra note 70, at 759-76.
156. Haley, supra note 153, at 118.
157. Id. at 117.
158. Id.
159. See infra notes 182-200.
160. See infra note 191.
161. See infra note 189.
162. Haley, supra note 153, at 114.
163. Id.
164. Uriu, supra note 4, at 99.
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selves from foreign competition."' 6 This disparity in political power
has complicated the policy-making process, especially where declin-
ing industries have favored protection over adjustment. 6 Adjust-
ment efforts by the government have been further frustrated in that
the declining industries' political influence has not waned with their
loss in economic leverage.16
Fourth, the economic ministries cannot force industry to accept
stabilization or other forms of adjustment assistance. " In the first
place, declining industries must initiate the adjustment process 69 of
their own will, and by the same token unemployed workers must vol-
untarily opt for employment adjustment assistance. 70 Industries
have not always agreed to comply with bureaucratic recommenda-
tions, as the Oil Cartel cases,' 71 which took place during the 1973 oil
crisis, demonstrated. Additionally, industrial commitment to consen-
sus-based policies is not as strong in Japan today as it had been in
the past.'" "When push comes to shove, when the desires of business
are directly opposed to those of the government, it is uncertain whose
interests will dominate."'7 In the absence of formal legal powers to
regulate the adjustment of declining industries, Japanese ministries
cannot require an industry and its related concerns to undergo re-
vamping or other forms of adjustment. This is especially so when
there is a lack of consensus regarding the issues crucial to the suc-
cess of the adjustment program.174 Japan's government functions can
therefore only hope to elucidate the urgent need for adjustment. 76
Finally, uncontrollable economic circumstances have served to
undermine the influence of Japan's economic ministries. There have
been both foreign and domestic movements to liberalize Japan's
trade, and some changes have come about from amendments in
trade and investment law. 76 "Increases in international pressure on
Japan to reduce its tariffs and quotas and to standardize its non-
165. Id.
166. One writer observed: "Declining industries and their dependents are apt to prefer
protection for the simple reason that adjustment subjects them to an uncertain future, while
protectionism at least maintains the status quo for a time." Reich, supra note 32, at 872.
167. Uriu, supra note 4, at 99.
168. Id.
169. INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, at 73.
170. See supra note 39.
171. See F. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 184-88 (1987).
172. "Industry groups have also come to discredit the informality of the cooperative
relationship between business and industry." Id. at 155. The effects of slower economic growth
have made decision-making and achieving consensus increasingly difficult. INDUSTRIAL POLICY
REPORT, supra note 8, at 96.
173. Uriu, supra note 4, at 109.
174. See INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT, supra note 8, at 74.
175. For example, the Japanese government has avoided using import restrictions be-
cause "[clontinued imports require that an industry face the problems of adjustment as
quickly and efficiently as possible." Id. at 73.
176. F. UPHAM, supra note 171, at 166.
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tariff barriers" ' are becoming more noticeable. Trends such as
these have "progressively weakened formal [bureaucratic] power
. . . until it [has become] virtually impossible [for the economic
ministries] to use [their] power in the traditional manner"17 8 to force
industry's compliance with ministerial guidelines.
1 79
In sum, these factors have caused Japan's economic ministries,
seemingly invincible during the period of rapid economic growth, to
gradually relinquish some of their hold over industry. Although min-
istries such as MITI and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) still com-
mand much influence and respect, they have done so only because of
their increasing reliance on informal policy enforcement mechanisms
collectively known as "administrative guidance." 180 The question of
whether Japan's "flexible" employment adjustment policies can be
carried out more efficiently in the near future than when the minis-
tries were at the apex of their authority in the high-growth period in
the 1950s and 1960s181 will remain unresolved until further observa-
tion and analysis can be conducted.
C. Bureaucratic Reliance on Administrative Guidance
In order to complete this brief re-evaluation of Japan's employ-
ment adjustment policy of the past decade, it will be necessary to
analyze the form of "law enforcement" which the Japanese eco-
nomic ministries have come to rely upon to a great extent: gy~sei
shid-6 (administrative guidance).18
Gy-sei shid- became a formal national policy with the enact-
ment of the Important Industries Control Law in 1931.188 It did not,
however, become an integral part of Japanese economic life until the
1950s, when the government loosened its antitrust controls over in-
dustry8 in order to stimulate economic growth and to promote the
general policy of "catching up with the West" in terms of interna-
tional competitiveness. In the present day, gyosei shid' refers to "the
means by which administrative organs exercise influence by non-au-
thoritative means without binding legal directives in order to guide
the recipient of administrative guidance by positive act or
omission. '"185
Administrative guidance is simply an informal process of law
177. Id. at 188.
178. See infra note 197.
179. See infra notes 186-89.
180. Cf. F. UPHAM, supra note 171, at 189.
181. F. UPHAM, supra note 171, at 109.
182. See infra notes 183-201 and accompanying text.
183. Important Industries Control Law, Law No. 40 of 1931.
184. Lansing & Rose, supra note 91, at 250.
185. Pape, Gyasei Shido and the Antimonopoly Law, 15 LAW IN JAPAN 12, 14 (1983).
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enforcement. "It is used to implement nearly all bureaucratic policy,
whether or not expressed in statute or regulation, at all levels of gov-
ernment and all administrative offices." '186 This form of law enforce-
ment encompasses measures such as directives (shiji), requests
(yobu), warnings (keikoku), suggestions (kankoku), and encourage-
ments (kansh-o).
1 87
Administrative guidance is not, however, a concept unique to
Japan, for it exists wherever informal law enforcement exists. 188
What typifies gy-sei shid- as characteristically Japanese is its ubiq-
uity; its pervasive use suggests that "it is not only a means of gov-
erning but the means of governing in Japan."1 89 It is also important
to note that administrative guidance is subject only to a given gov-
ernmental organ's jurisdiction, and that it cannot violate the law
even though it is not based on any explicit law." °
It cannot be emphasized enough that administrative guidance is
not legally enforceable; there is not statutory authority which grants
enforcement power. 91 Administrative guidance "involves neither for-
mal legal action nor direct legal coercion," '92 and this is where its
chief weaknesses lie.
In the first place, administrative guidance, "which amounts to
an allocation of discretionary and unsupervised authority to the bu-
reaucracy, is obviously open to abuse, and may, if used improperly,
result in damage to the market." 9 This is especially true where it is
suspected that a bureaucracy is engaging in some sort of malpractice
while using administrative guidance as a cover for its actions. 94
Second, administrative guidance may not be the most cost-effi-
cient method of law enforcement. 195 As one writer put it,
[t]he danger in the absence of the concept of the "rule of law,"
186. Haley, supra note 153, at I11.
187. D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: LAWS AND POLICIES 202 (1973).
188. Haley, supra note 153, at 110.
189. C. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 265.
190. Cf. Yamanouchi, Administrative Guidance and the Rule of Law, 7 LAW IN JAPAN
22 (1974). See also F. UPHAM, supra note 171, at 169:
The legal framework within which . . . administrative guidance operate[s] con-
sists of the statutory basis of MITI's authority and the administrative law doc-
trines that define its limits. The former delineates the areas in which MITI can
exercise its discretion; the latter determines by whom, when, and in what forum
that exercise can be challenged.
Id.
191. Haley, supra note 153, at 109.
192. C. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 318.
193. Id. at 267. The author implies that market forces will be disrupted if a ministry is
not impartial during arbitration proceedings, if it conceals an illegal cartel under the guise of
administrative guidance, and if a ministry is captured by the people it is supposed to be regu-
lating. Id. at 267-68.




JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT POLICY
as far as business and industrial interests are concerned, lies in
the fact that no sensible prediction can be made of the results of
certain business transactions, where these involve administrative
agencies. Thus rational business planning and operations become
more difficult and this could eventually lead to instability in in-
dustrial and trade developments.'"
Third, administrative guidance is weak in the sense that it is
dependent upon the voluntary compliance of the party receiving the
guidance in order to be effective and "enforceable." A bureaucracy
can request, cajole, or even threaten an industry to enforce compli-
ance with a certain guideline.191 But as long as administrative guid-
ance has no technical legal force, recipients do not have to fear law-
ful retaliation for noncompliance.
Finally, the economic bureaucracies almost exclusively rely on
administrative guidancese as a source of law enforcement. Gyusei
shid-o is so pervasive in contemporary Japan that policy-makers have
become complacent in the belief that recipients will willingly comply
with ministry recommendations. While most recipients invariably
choose to obey bureaucratic directives,'99 it does not necessarily fol-
low that all future recipients of administrative guidance will do the
same. A recipient is unlikely to comply with a ministry request if it
feels that the costs of compliance will substantially outweigh the
benefits of compliance. 00
To summarize, the underlying weak nature of informal law en-
forcement such as gy-sei shid-, the relative lack of formal regula-
tion,20 ' and the almost total dependence on ubiquitous informal
means has significantly affected the economic ministries' ability to
smoothly administer Japan's employment adjustment programs.
True comprehensiveness and flexibility in unemployment policy for
the declining industries will be difficult to achieve if the bureaucra-
cies fail to gain sufficient authority to implement adjustment policy
in the future.
196. Id.
197. For example, a recipient company's privileges may be withheld, or incentives such
as tax benefits, favorable loans, and subsidies for research and development may be extended
to solicit compliance. E. HAHN, supra note 108, at 116-17.
198. "MITI has plied its administrative guidance through trade associations and indus-
try-wide coordinating groups, and now depends mainly on this technique." R. CAVES & M.
UEKUSA, supra note 45, at 150-51.
199. "Informal enforcement is most effective ... to the extent that what is requested is
viewed as ultimately beneficial or relatively more beneficial to the respondent or that failure to
comply is perceived to be likely to result in greater disadvantage than would compliance."
Haley, supra note 153, at 113.
200. Id.
201. "The lack of contempt power by the courts or an analogue to it . ..precludes
effective formal legal enforcement . . . . Without significant civil or administrative sanctions,
the primary formal legal means in Japan for compelling conduct is the criminal penalty
... .Id. at 116.
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V. Conclusion
Japan has succeeded to a large extent in developing a compre-
hensive and flexible approach to the grave socioeconomic problem of
unemployment in the declining industries. No industrial policy, how-
ever, can be perfect, regardless of its rationality. This holds true for
Japan's employment adjustment policies in the late 1970s and early
1980s. There are weaknesses in the legal bases of the Japanese ad-
justment assistance programs as well as in the form of enforcement
the Japanese government has utilized to implement those policies.
For the future, failure to cultivate better methods of carrying out the
purposes of employment adjustment may well result in the demise of
what is otherwise a rational approach to adjust and stabilize troub-
led industries and their workers.
The role that Japanese labor unions, currently in a state of dis-
array due to economic and political weakness, 02 may be able to play
in the future rationalization of Japan's declining industries is specu-
lative at best. The unions have the potential to become a powerful
medium to implement employment adjustment policies, since Japan's
labor problems in the declining sectors are likely to have a long-last-
ing effect on society, politics, and the economy. It is imperative for
the work force to take the initiative in employment adjustment and
cooperate with the pertinent authorities in order to contribute to a
smoother transition to a post-industrial Japanese economy.
Susan N. Duke
202. See generally Galenson & Odaka, supra. note 141, at 627-33.
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